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Abstract
One of the major objectives of adopting service-oriented architecture (SOA) is to enhance the
IS agility of organizations and improve IT-business alignment. In practice the contradictory
experiences about SOA implementation turn out to be a paradox: why many organizations
failed to meet their expectations about SOA implementation efforts, while others succeeded?
Contrast to prior research on SOA, this study adopts the process perspective and provides
plausible theoretical explanations for the "SOA implementation paradox". Specifically, the
study uses multiple case-study methods to develop a system dynamics model which
highlights the feedback loops and time delay during the SOA implementation process. The
results reveal the dynamic characteristics of learning curve of SOA implementation and two
organizational traps (technology learning trap and implementation effectiveness trap)
associated with SOA implementation. Technology learning trap refers to the situation that the
less learning in using the technology, the more difficult and complex the technology is
perceived. Implementation effectiveness trap refers to the situation in which the organization
may misperceive the inappropriateness of SOA when SOA implementation is temporally less
effective and perceived benefits of SOA are delayed. The theory of the organizational traps
can be generalized to a broad context of innovative IS implementation. Further, the
theoretical causes of the traps are investigated. Finally, the research implication of this study
and connections with existing literature on IS and organization are discussed.
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Understanding Organizational Traps in Implementing
Service-Oriented Architecture
ABSTRACT
One of the major objectives of adopting service-oriented architecture (SOA) is to enhance the IS
agility of organizations and improve IT-business alignment. In practice the contradictory
experiences about SOA implementation turn out to be a paradox: why many organizations failed
to meet their expectations about SOA implementation efforts, while others succeeded? Contrast
to prior research on SOA, this study adopts the process perspective and provides plausible
theoretical explanations for the “SOA implementation paradox”. Specifically, the study uses
multiple case-study methods to develop a system dynamics model which highlights the feedback
loops and time delay during the SOA implementation process. The results reveal the dynamic
characteristics of learning curve of SOA implementation and two organizational traps
(technology learning trap and implementation effectiveness trap) associated with SOA
implementation. Technology learning trap refers to the situation in which a certain technology is
less understood due to insufficient learning, the more difficult and complex the technology is
perceived. Implementation effectiveness trap refers to the situation in which SOA is
misperceived to be inappropriate when SOA implementation is temporally less effective and the
perceived benefits of SOA are delayed. The theory of the organizational traps can be generalized
to a broad context of innovative IS implementation. Further, the theoretical causes of the traps
are investigated. Finally, the research implication of this study and connections with existing
literature on IS and organizational study are discussed.
Keywords: Service-oriented Architecture (SOA), IS implementation, organizational traps,
organizational change and learning, system dynamics
Preliminary version – Please do NOT cite, quote or distribute without the authors’ permission.
Comments are very welcome and can be sent to Xitong Li (xitongli@mit.edu).
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Understanding Organizational Traps in Implementing
Service-Oriented Architecture
INTRODUCTION
In an increasing fast-changing environment, it is important for an organization to be able to adapt
its IT systems and quickly respond to changing business conditions. Such an ability is defined as
the organization’s information systems (IS) agility1 (Choi et al. 2010) and has been considered as
a key facilitator to enhance dynamic capabilities (Sher et al. 2004) and competitive advantages
(Luthria et al. 2009b; Winter 2003). However, the traditional IT systems, e.g., Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) systems, are usually designed using a monolithic architecture and built
as integrated sets of software modules linked to a common database, handling corporate
functions like finance, human resources, material management, and sales (Robey et al. 2002). It
is thus quite difficult, expensive and time-consuming for organizations to make changes to their
IT systems designed using the monolithic architecture (Choi et al. 2010). To address such
inappropriateness, service-oriented architecture (SOA) has been advocated as a new computing
paradigm to build IT systems in organizations (Papazoglou et al. 2003). In this paper, SOA refers
to “the architecture style that supports loosely coupled services to enable business flexibility in
an interoperable, technology-agnostic manner” (Borges et al. 2004) and consists of a composite
set of business-aligned services that support a flexible and dynamically reconfigurable end-toend business process realization using interface-based service descriptions.
One of the major objectives of adopting SOA is to enhance the IS agility of organizations
and improve IT-business alignment (Bieberstein et al. 2005; Choi et al. 2010; Mueller et al.
2010). Many organizations with the expectation to reap those potential benefits have invested in
1

Information S ystem (IS) a gility is d efined b y Choi e t a l. (2010) a s “the ability t o q uickly make c hanges t o I T
applications in response to changing business conditions”.
2
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SOA. A recent Forrester report reveals that 71% of the enterprises surveyed are already using
SOA or will be by the end of 2011 (Kanaracus 2011). However, mixed outcomes about SOA
adoption and implementation have been often reported. For example, a 2007 InformationWeek
Web survey of 278 IT professionals found that 32% of those using SOA said those projects fell
short of expectations and “of those, 58% said their SOA projects introduced more complexity
into their IT environments, and 30% said they cost more than expected. Out of all respondents
using SOAs, just 10% said the results exceeded expectations” (Smith 2008). In stark contrast,
CA Technologies recently released a survey which covered 615 companies in the process of
SOA-based efforts and found that 92% of their SOA initiatives met or exceeded business unit
objectives (McKendrick 2011). The contradictory outcomes turn out to be a paradox of SOA
adoption and implementation. The key puzzle regarding the “SOA implementation paradox” is
why many organizations failed to meet their expectations about their efforts on SOA
implementation, while others succeeded. Given the growing significance and risk of SOA, it is
surprising that there is a scarcity of academic research addressing the SOA implementation
paradox (Luthria et al. 2009a).
Mohr (1982) identifies two different perspectives of organizational research: variance and
process perspectives (Mohr 1982). According to Mohr’s distinction, variance research seeks to
explain variation in outcome variables by associating them with predictor variables and
necessary and sufficient conditions. By contrast, process research seeks to explain organizational
phenomena occurring by examining sequences of events over time (Robey et al. 2002). To date,
prior academic research on SOA has largely adopted the variance perspective. Specifically, prior
research on SOA has intensively claimed potential benefits and business value of SOA
(Cherbakov et al. 2005; Mueller et al. 2010; Varadan et al. 2008), but there are only a few

3
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empirical works actually measuring the benefits of specific SOA implementation (Baskerville et
al. 2005; Moitra et al. 2005). Despite the potential benefits claimed, organizations implementing
SOA often encounter challenges in their efforts. To address those challenges, more recent, yet
relatively even few, literature turns to explore critical success factor (CSF) that potentially affect
SOA implementation. Research in this strand tends to enumerate a number of factors that
potentially facilitate or impede organizations to receive the intended benefits of SOA. Prior
research, however, failed to explore the causal relationships and, particularly, complex
interactions between those critical factors. After all, prior research on SOA largely from the
variance perspective posits an invariant relationship between antecedents and outcomes, which is
too stringent to explain organizational phenomena (Markus et al. 1988). Besides that, after a
extensively literature review, Luthri et al. (2009a) found “there is little or no realistic data
available on what, if anything, firms are doing in practice to address the inherent challenges of
implementing a service-oriented architecture…” (Luthria et al. 2009a). There is a clear need for
research to provide qualitative data from case studies on SOA implementation. In sum, to the
best of our knowledge, there has been neither theoretical formulation nor empirical examination
of SOA implementation in the literature. This paper seeks to fill the gap at those aspects.
Noticing the widely-reported contradictory experiences with SOA implementation, the
research presented in this paper suggests that we may be able to make some sense of the
apparently inconsistent outcomes by shifting the focus away from the variance perspective to the
process perspective. Unlike the variance research, the process studies “have lower aspirations
about ‘explained variance’, but provide richer explanations of how and why the outcomes occur
[and] when they do occur” (Markus et al. 1988). As demonstrated in this paper, the process
perspective is appropriate to specify temporal relations among theoretical elements and study the

4
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micro-processes of capability-enhancing organizational change (Repenning et al. 2002) and thus
allow us to explain different experiences of the SOA implementation paradox.
Using process perspective, this paper interprets the implementation process of SOA as a
specific case of IT-based improvement process of an organization’s IS agility and conceptualizes
it as a form of organizational change. The core research question is: how various critical
elements interact with each other during the SOA implementation process and result in the
organizational traps 2 associated with the process?
In answering this question, this paper develops a theory through an inductive research
strategy of process-focused improvement which was successfully used in Repenning’s works on
manufacturing process improvement (Repenning et al. 2001; Repenning et al. 2002). Note that
our research does not simply apply the existing organizational theory of capability traps
(Repenning et al. 2001; Repenning et al. 2002) to understanding the challenges in SOA
implementation. In fact, based on our observation and investigation, SOA implementation has at
least two inherent characteristics distinct from process improvement in manufacturing (see the
discussion in the next section). Accordingly, the model and theory developed in this paper
suggest that two different but intertwined organizational traps, technology learning trap and
implementation effectiveness trap, play important roles in the difficulty of many SOA
implementation efforts. As will be explained in detail, technology learning trap refers to the
situation in which a certain technology is less understood due to insufficient learning, the more
difficult and complex the technology is perceived. Implementation effectiveness trap refers to the
situation in which SOA is misperceived to be inappropriate when SOA implementation is
temporally less effective and the perceived benefits of SOA are delayed. Both organizational
2

Organizational traps in this p aper specifically refer to technology learning trap and implementation effectiveness
trap, both of which will be introduced in the next paragraph.
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traps are distinct from the existing theory of capability traps and have not been discussed in the
existing literature.
This research makes two important contributions to the literature on information systems
and organizational studies. First, the theoretical contribution provides the theory of
organizational traps in SOA implementation from the process perspective. The organizational
traps constitute a theoretical explanation for the contradictory outcomes of the implementation of
innovative technology in general and SOA in particular. The theory offers fruitful insights for
understanding the implementation and use of SOA in organizations. Second, the empirical
contribution provides meaningful qualitative data about how organizations have implemented
SOA in practice. The empirical results reveal that the inherent tradeoffs of SOA implementation
between short-term performance drop and potential long-term benefits and between local project
needs and organization-level IS agility. Human agency of organizational actors plays an
important role in the tradeoffs and may facilitate or impede SOA implementation, depending on
different organizational contexts.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We organize the relevant academic research into two parts. The first part is the prior studies on
SOA, most (if not all) of which have adopted the variance research perspective. Two particular
strands can be distinguished: research on potential benefits of SOA and research on critical
success factors of SOA implementation 3. The second part of relevant literature is Repenning’s
works on capability traps in manufacturing process improvement (Repenning et al. 2001;
Repenning et al. 2002) and innovation implementation (Repenning 2002).

3

Although there are extensive prior studies on the success and challenges of ERP implementation, research focusing
on the challenges of SOA implementation is very limited. This is one of the unique motivations of this paper.
6
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Variance Research on SOA
Potential Benefits of SOA
The potential benefits and business value of SOA have been numerously claimed in the literature
(Mueller et al. 2010; Varadan et al. 2008). An early work (Yoon et al. 2007) has analyzed
multiple cases and suggested that the realized benefits of SOA can be classified into two groups:
improved business agility and cost reduction. The benefits contributing to improved business
agility include easier integration of components and systems (Cherbakov et al. 2005), better ITbusiness alignment (Bieberstein et al. 2005), and a quicker response to market change or
customer demand (Choi et al. 2010). The benefits of cost reduction consist of lower application
development costs/time, reuse of existing components/services (Fricko 2006), and lower
maintenance costs. The recent work (Mueller et al. 2010) develops a comprehensive conceptual
framework to understanding the economic potential of SOA. According to their work, SOA
relies on three fundamental design principles: modularity, loose coupling, and standards. They
built on the resource-based view and argued that SOA can enhance an organization’s IS
capabilities which in our research is conceptualized as IS agility (Choi et al. 2010). By enhancing
IS capabilities, SOA is expected to provide multi-dimensional benefits for organizations,
including IT infrastructure, operational, strategic, managerial and organizational benefits. At the
individual level, IT developers’ productivity is also believed to be enhanced by improved IS
reusability and interoperability from SOA design principles (Choi et al. 2010; Hau et al. 2008;
Mueller et al. 2010).
Despite the numerous benefits claimed in the literature, organizations adopting SOA
cannot receive those intended benefits automatically. This strand of literature generally adopts

7
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technological determinism and omits processual elements and the actions of key players
associated with SOA implementation and organizational change.
Critical Success Factors of SOA Implementation
More recent (yet relatively few) literature turns to explore critical success factors (CSF) and
challenges that potentially affect SOA implementation. The work (Luthria et al. 2008) explores
the organizational constraints and challenges experienced by firms considering the enterprisewide SOA implementation. They analyzed several case studies and propose a set of seven best
practices for successful enterprise-level SOA implementation. The top three are: 1) get
commitment at the broad level; 2) manage expectations and invest in SOA for the long term; and
3) align the entire organization along the SOA strategy. The work (Luthria et al. 2009a) presents
six factors that influence the organizational adoption of SOA, among which the perceived value
to the organization is ranked as the most important factor. The work (Boh et al. 2010) examines
two organizational factors that are potentially critical in ensuring the success of SOA
implementation: top management support and the centralization of IT decision-making. Their
empirical results from hypothesis testing indicate that top management support is a significant
factor, yet centralization of IT decision-making is not. The recent work (Lee et al. 2010)
conducts a more comprehensive research and identifies 20 factors in SOA implementation based
on their review of 34 SOA studies and 22 interviews with both vendors and users. Their results
show that “building strong support for enterprise-wide core human resources” and “clear goalsetting based on business value” are often ranked among top 3 by all the empirical data
(literature review, interview with vendors and users).
The research strand on CSF tends to list a number of factors that potentially affect SOA
implementation and facilitate or impede organizations to receive the intended benefits of SOA.

8
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Like the research on potential benefits of SOA, the research on CSF omits processual elements
and the actions of key players associated with SOA implementation. Also, prior research on SOA
fails to explore the causal relationships among those critical factors. More importantly, none of
them investigates how those critical factors interact with each other during the dynamics of the
multi-month/year process of SOA implementation. Therefore, prior research on SOA offers little
in the way of theoretical explanations for the puzzling SOA implementation paradox.
The abovementioned literature repeatedly points out that top management commitment
and support are very critical to the success of SOA implementation. The commitment is required
to be long-term and enterprise-wide, rather than short-term or local-focused. Besides that, the
perceived benefits and business value from SOA are also very important to the implementation.
In fact, management commitment and perceived benefits from SOA are strongly dependent; they
interact with each other during the process of SOA implementation. The model and theory in this
paper capture this important point.
Capability Traps in Process Improvement
Another relevant literature is Repenning’s works on capability traps in process improvement
(Repenning et al. 2001; Repenning et al. 2002) and innovation implementation (Repenning
2002). His research focuses on Total Quality Management (TQM) initiatives in manufacturing
and develops causal-loop diagrams and system dynamic models to understand the impact of time
delays between investing in process improvement and realizing the benefits. He argues that the
long delays in the feedback loops of process improvement create the dynamics of the “worsebefore-better” pattern and cause capability traps and self-confirming errors. Specifically,
considering the “worse-before-better” pattern, workers initially tend to underinvest in process
improvement and often find themselves falling short of meeting the performance target due to

9
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insufficient process capability. Thus, workers are forced to further shift time from process
improvement and increase work hours. Accordingly, the dynamics of process improvement work
as vicious cycles and workers are trapped in a downward spiral of eroding process capability,
forcing less and less time for improvement. Eventually, the capability traps resulted in the
failures of many process improvement efforts.
The phenomenon of beneficial improvement and innovations that go unused have been
documented not only in TQM but other administrative initiatives, such as human resource
practices (Pfeffer et al. 2000) and best practices for product development (Wheelwright et al.
1995). The inability of many organizations to use the knowledge embodied in the improvement
initiatives is a central issue facing organizational theorists (Pfeffer 1997). Although Repenning’s
work has been successfully used to explain process improvement in manufacturing, it is
unknown whether or not the similar phenomenon had happened during IS improvement efforts in
general and SOA implementation in particular. To date, none of IS literature has provided
theoretical explanation for the contradictory outcomes of SOA implementation from the
perspective of improvement process. As one of the major contributions, this research finds two
organizational traps (technology learning trap and implementation effectiveness trap), which
result from the interaction between human judgmental biases and the physical structure of IS
development processes, may occur in the failures of many SOA implementation efforts.
It is worth noting that this research does not simply apply the theory of capability traps to
understanding the challenges in SOA implementation. Our observation and investigation reveal
that SOA implementation has two inherent characteristics that are distinct from TQM and
process improvement programs in manufacturing:

10
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1) SOA implementation often requires enterprise-wide involvement and commitment, while
process improvement programs often focus on certain work process (e.g., manufacturing,
product development). It is more challenging to call for and maintain enterprise-wide,
long-term involvement and commitment in organizations.
2) In regard to process improvement programs, it is relatively easier to identify defects and
correct them when the process capability is low (Repenning et al. 2002). Thus, favorable
results and word of mouth are easier to achieve and come earlier from the investment in
improvement. Unfortunately, SOA implementation is not such a case. The learning curve
of the complex technology like SOA creates longer substantial delay and postpones the
potential benefits of SOA at the early stage of SOA implementation. It should be
anticipated that developers may perceive little SOA effectiveness when they just start
learning how to use IT systems developed by SOA design principles. Overcoming the
learning-curve barrier is critical to achieve perceived benefits from SOA.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology used in this study is system dynamics modeling (Sterman 2000), with
an aim of generating an explanatory theory of organizational traps associated with SOA
implementation. This methodology has been shown to be a powerful modeling tool for
organizational theory building (Repenning et al. 2002; Rudolph et al. 2009; Sastry 1997;
Sterman 2000). Since Abdel-Hamid and Madnick started using it in investigating software
project management in 1980s (Abdel-Hamid et al. 1991), system dynamic modeling has
continued to receive increasing attention in IS research (Cao et al. 2010; Choi et al. 2010;
Georgantzas et al. 2008; Rahmandad et al. 2009b). This research adopts system dynamics
modeling for three primary reasons.

11
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First, system dynamics modeling highlights the processual elements and the actions of
key players associated with organizational change which are often omitted in IS studies that rely
on the variance perspective and cross-sectional, quantitative data (Markus et al. 1988;
Orlikowski 1993). System dynamics modeling provides “a useful context in which to study the
micro-processes that impede or facilitate competence-enhancing change” (Repenning et al. 2002)
and is compatible with the focus of process perspective of organizational research to “explain
outcomes by examining sequences of events over time” (Markus et al. 1988; Robey et al. 2002).
As indicated above, process research on SOA is simply missing in the extant literature. Thus, the
research approach that specifically includes elements of process and change is particularly
appropriate here.
Second, as Weick (1979) notes, “It is the network of causal relationships that impose
many of the controls in organizations and that stabilize or disrupt the organization. It is the
patterns of these causal links that account for much of what happens in organizations” (Weick
1979). Unfortunately, Law and Urry (2004) pointed out “social science method has problems in
understanding non-linearity relationships and flows” (Law et al. 2004). Compared to other
organizational research methodologies, system dynamics modeling has its strengths and is
particularly useful here, because it allows focusing on the feedback loops and nonlinearity of the
change associated with SOA implementation process (Sterman 2000).
Third, system dynamics modeling specifically focuses on the effects of the feedback
delay on organizatinal change and learning (Rahmandad et al. 2009a; Sterman 2000). Thus, it
allows generating unique insights into the dynamics of implementation and appropriation of
SOA, which are less likely to be produced using other organizational methods.

12
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In sum, system dynamics modeling is particularly appropriate in this research, as it
provides “an opportunity to examine continuous processes in context… and thereby reveal the
multiple sources of loops of causation and connectivity so crucial to identifying and explaining
patterns in the process of change” (Pettigrew 1989).
Sample Selection
We employed multiple comparative case study design in this research. Case study is justified as a
research strategy that “attempts to examine: (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life
context, especially when (b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident” (Yin 1981). Although case studies often report phenomena observed in a single case
(Orlikowski 1992) or two comparative cases (Orlikowski 1993; Repenning et al. 2002), multiple
case studies have been effectively used in IS research (Abdel-Hamid et al. 1991; Bandara et al.
2005; Robey et al. 2002). Multiple comparative case studies were conducted here for two
reasons. First, Robey et al. (2002) note that “Although some richness of detail may be sacrificed
with additional cases, the ability to compare phenomena across different contexts in enhanced”
(Robey et al. 2002). By using the case cluster method (McClintock et al. 1979), the ability of
multiple case comparisons can be even enhanced. Second, multiple case study design is
compatible with our research interest in generating a theory that is applicable to a general
organizational context rather than that for a specific one. The research sample consists of 10
North American organizations that have recently implemented or been implementing SOA,
including EMC, Raytheon, Oracle, SAP, MIT Lincoln Lab and several US government agencies.
While some of them only implemented SOA in their own organizations like US government
agencies, most of others, like EMC, Raytheon, Oracle, SAP and MIT Lincoln Lab, have
implemented SOA not only in their own organizations but for other organizations as contractors.

13
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Data Collection
In this research, we followed the standard method of data collection that was used in AbdelHamid and Madnick’s works on software project management (Abdel-Hamid et al. 1991).
Sterman (2000) also suggested a similar method of data collection and analysis which mainly
uses semistructured interviews and literature review. Specifically, we took three steps as follows.
First, the initial series of 10 unstructured interviews were conducted with 14 different
managers and developers. Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. After the purpose of the
research was explained, informants began by describing their professional background. They
were then asked to share their experience associated with SOA implementation efforts in the
organization. Finally, they were asked to speculate the potential key challenges and elements that
facilitated or impeded those SOA implementation efforts. In particular, we focused on collecting
data that reveals the dependencies between those elements and the interactions of the elements
occurring over time. To build more confidence in our findings and to come up with “holistic and
multifaceted explanations of change” (Pettigrew 1990), numerous follow-up conversations on
telephone and via email, intensive documentation review, and direct on-site observation were
also conducted to supplement the data collection. The various techniques of data collection is
particularly beneficial in theory generation because “it provides multiple perspectives on an
issue, supplies more information on emerging concepts, allows for cross-checking, and yields
stronger substantiation of constructs” (Orlikowski 1993).
Second, an extensive review of the literature was conducted, after a “skeleton” model
was built based on the information collected at the first phase. The “skeleton” model served as a
useful guideline for the literature review. As Forrester (1968) suggested in his classic book on
system dynamics, “A model should come first. And one of the first uses of the model should be

14
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to determine what formal data need to be collected” (Forrester 1968). The literature review
provides guidance in techniques for qualitative data collection and analysis and filled in many
gaps of the “skeleton” model, leading to a more detailed version of the model. Also, each causal
link in the model was justified by the supportive evidence from the literature review.
Third, another series of 12 interviews were conducted with 15 informants. With the
concepts and model generated from the prior two stages, the interviews of this phase became
more structured than that in the first phase. Likewise, various techniques of data collection were
used such as numerous follow-up conversations, intensive documentation review and on-site
observation. As is typical with interpretive research based on qualitative data (Locke et al. 2001;
Pettigrew 1990), we triangulated across the multiple data sources and proceeded iteratively
between the data gathered and the model.
Data Analysis
The data analysis was begun with the traditional methods for inductive research study.
Constructs and patterns of interest were identified from the initial data analysis and categories of
the constructs formed based on the coding. Key variables and causal links among them emerged
during the analysis. Then, we used the causal loop diagramming method common in system
dynamics (Repenning et al. 2002; Sterman 2000) to develop the “skeleton” model. While
developing the model, we emphasized the essential feedback loops that would generate the
patterns of SOA implementation emerged from the coded data. These feedback loops allow the
emerging model and theory to focus on the processual elements and exploring the dynamics of
the implementation process. Following the similar methods, data analysis after the data
collection in the second and third phase provided an opportunity to refine, improve and validate
the emerging model.

15
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Note that in this research data analysis and collection actually overlapped and were
iteratively conducted. Overlapping data analysis with data collection, as Eisenhardt (1989)
notes, “not only gives the researcher a head start in analysis, but more importantly allows
researchers to take advantage of flexible data collection”. Further, the data collected in a later
phase allowed us to refine and improve the model 4 and to “criticize it, expose it again and so on
in an iterative process that would continue as long as it proves to be useful” (Abdel-Hamid et al.
1991). As indicated above, we combined various techniques of data collection synergistically
and conducted the data analysis overlapping data collection through iterative methods of constant
comparison and extensive memo writing (Ryan et al. 2000). In such a way, we were able to
produce complete accounts of the organizations that had implemented or were implementing
SOA. Thus, the resulting causal-loop model is both tightly grounded in our data and provides a
logical and internally consistent explanation for how the micro-level interactions involved in
SOA implementation combined to create the more macro-level dynamics of the entire process.
MODEL
In this research, we use system dynamics modeling to develop the causal-loop diagrams for the
theory building (Sterman 2000). System dynamics models consist of stocks, flows and causal
links between variables. Stocks and flows are used to model physical and/or organizational
processes, wherein a stock, denoted by a rectangle, represents the level that can accumulate or
deplete over time. Flows denoted by straight arrows with valves cause an increase or decrease in
stock levels. Stocks and flows complement feedback loops, representing the physical and/or
organizational system’s structure. Positive (self-reinforcing) and balancing (self-correcting)
4

Besides informative interviews, some IT managers/developers even spent 2-4 hours with the authors together and
went through every single variable and causal link of the model. Their inputs and feedbacks allowed the authors to
produce th e f inal model la rgely g rounded upon e mpirical ex periences o f t hose p ractitioners. By d oing s o, t he
validity of the model was strengthened by being validated directly with the sources.
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feedback loops play an important role in determining the dynamic behaviors of organizational
systems. The model consisting of causal-loop diagrams captures the key reinforcing and
balancing feedback loops.
Note that the causal-loop diagrams in this paper are not intended to provide an accurate
mathematical specification of the causal links. Yet by explicitly demonstrating feedbacks with
nonlinearity, discontinuities and time delays between causes and effects, causal-loop
diagramming enables us to reach a new level of specificity concerning the mutual causality. Thus
far this approach has been effectively used in organizational theory development (Perlow et al.
2002; Repenning et al. 2001; Repenning et al. 2002; Rudolph et al. 2009; Sastry 1997).
Specifying a formal mathematical model is often the next step in testing the theories embodied in
the causal-loop diagrams and is not the focus of this paper. It is also worth noting that in building
the model and theory, we focused on the evidences that are generalizable across multiple
organizations instead of those merely applied to a specific organization. By doing so, we were
able to make the model, although seemingly oversimplified, built in a broad organizational
context and produce general theoretical insights and implications.
The first assumption in our model is that only a proportion of delivered IT systems in an
organization are service-oriented systems. The rationale of this assumption lies in that IT
developers need to spend extra time and energy to follow the SOA design principles (e.g.,
modularity, loose coupling, and standards) (Mueller et al. 2010) in order to make the delivered
systems service-oriented. Otherwise, the delivered systems just turn out to be non-serviceoriented and are installed in the organization. The first key variable in the model is Proportion of
Service-Oriented Systems, which is the ratio of the number of Service-Oriented Systems to the
number of total Installed IT Systems. Basically, Proportion of Service-Oriented Systems is used
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to capture the penetration of SOA in the organization. In Figure 1, Installed IT Systems is a stock
and denoted by a rectangle. Figure 1 shows the stock of IT system requirements backlog
accumulates as system requirements are introduced over time. The delivered IT systems are
installed with System Delivery Rate. Service-Oriented System Delivery Rate is a fraction of the
overall System Delivery Rate. The fraction coefficient depends on the fraction of working hours
spent on implementing SOA requirements. The “+” sign at the head of the causal link from
System Delivery Rate to Service-Oriented System Delivery Rate means there is a positive causal
relationship between the two variables. That is, all other factors are equal, the higher System
Delivery Rate, the higher Service-Oriented System Delivery Rate. Any IT systems regardless of
service-orientation or not may erode over time due to the change of business environment or
need for technology upgrade.
Figure 1: Proportion of Installed IT Systems Are Service-Oriented Systems

We present the key feedback loops in the rest of this section and then synthesize them in
the causal-loop model. Readers may need to keep the entire causal-loop model (see Figure 6) in
mind while reading through each of the feedback loops.
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Balancing Loop B1
Figure 2 shows the higher Proportion of Service-Oriented Systems, as the conceptualization of
the organizational penetration of SOA, enhance the organization’s IS agility (Choi et al. 2010).
The IS Agility Gap, defined as the difference between the Desired IS Agility and the actual IS
Agility, results in the need and Pressure to Implement SOA. From the perspective of most
managers, Desired IS Agility is an exogenous demand. Management Commitment is also
required along with IS Agility Gap to generate Pressure to Implement SOA, reflecting the fact
that management commitment and support is a critical success factor of SOA implementation
(Boh et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2010). Under the Pressure to Implement SOA, developers are forced
to put a fraction of the work hours spent on implementing SOA requirements. The time spent on
SOA requirements represents the developers need to spend extra time to follow the SOA design
principles when they develop the IT systems. The more time spent on SOA REQ, the higher
Service-Oriented System Delivery Rate. However, the rise of Service-Oriented System Delivery
Rate with the increase of Fraction of Time Spent on SOA REQ can only be realized after a
substantial time delay, because developers have to learn how to build service-oriented systems.
The small rectangle labeled with “Delay” depicts the substantial time delay in the causal link
between Fraction of Time Spent on SOA REQ and Service-Oriented System Delivery Rate. In
Figure 2, the balancing loop B1 represents the fact that developers implement service-oriented
systems under certain pressure created by the combination of the organization’s lack of IS agility
and management commitment to SOA implementation. By a balancing loop B1, it suggests that
the IS Agility Gap is being closed over time when more service-oriented systems are
implemented and installed, releasing the Pressure to Implement SOA.
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Figure 2: Balancing Loop B1: Implement Service-Oriented Systems under Pressure

Balancing Loop B2 & B3
Figure 3 shows the normal work structure of IT developers in their daily work lives. With the IT
System REQ Backlog and the cycle time requested by business units for delivering IT systems,
IT managers and developers calculate the Desired Delivery Rate. The IT department has its
actual System Delivery Rate which is determined by Developer Headcount, a developer’s
average Development Productivity, and how much time developers need to spend on functional
requirements of the IT systems. Note that Development Productivity and System Delivery Rate
are two distinct performance indicators. Development Productivity refers to on average how
many IT systems 5 that a developer can deliver within one unit of time (say one month) when the
developer spends all of his work hours on the development of functionalities. Differently,
System Delivery Rate refers to how many IT systems that the development team as a whole (e.g.,
5

For m easurement co nsideration, a d eveloper’s d evelopment p roductivity ca n b e m easured as unit o f s oftware
components, modules or functional features.
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the entire IT department) can deliver within one unit of time during which the developers may
spend part of their work hours on implementing SOA requirement or attending training sessions
about SOA, etc. From the perspective of managers, System Delivery Rate is an aggregate-level
and more salient performance indicator. A manager who used to be the CIO of a large US
university told us that:
As a manager, I usually don’t care much about a single developer’s productivity. I
always care about how fast we [as a team] are able to deliver the systems requested [by
business units]. In other words, we mostly care about the overall system delivery rate .
Figure 3: Balancing Loop B2 & B3: Work Harder to Deliver on Schedule and Bypass SOA

Delivery Rate Gap refers to the difference between Desired Delivery Rate and System
Delivery Rate. Unlike IS Agility Gap creating Pressure to Implement SOA, the Delivery Rate
Gap can create the pressure to deliver IT systems on schedule (whether service oriented or not),
reflecting the fact that the primary tasks of developers are to develop and deliver IT systems to
end users from business units. Pressure to Deliver on Schedule has two simultaneous effects on
developers’ work decisions: on the one hand, developers are forced to spend a substantial faction
of time on implementing the functional requirements requested by end users. In this case,
developers have to work harder on functional development (more essential tasks of their works)
and try to catch up the delivery schedule; the balancing loop B2 represents this case. After
conducing 27 field interviews on software development projects, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick
(1991) stated that “when faced with schedule pressures as a project falls behind schedule,
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software developers typically respond by concentrating more on the essential tasks of the job”
(Abdel-Hamid et al. 1991) (p17). On the other hand, the developers, now working harder on
functional development, have to reduce part of their work hours that would have been spent on
SOA requirements otherwise. In fact, when asked how developers made the tradeoff of work
hours under the pressure to deliver systems on schedule, the IT manager of an interviewed
organization replied:
The requirement list we received from other departments usually put functional
requirements on top of non-functional [service-oriented] requirements. But those nonfunctional requirements were not mandatory. When we received the requirement list,
we would check it and if we don’t have enough time, we just cut off those nonfunctional requirements.… After all, we have to deliver the capabilities [functionalities
of the IT systems] to our end users within the limited schedule and resources.
The balancing loop B3 captures such a situation in which developers could bypass the SOA
requirements in order to deliver the functionalities of the IT systems on schedule. Both balancing
loops B2 and B3 reveal that developers tend to bypass the SOA requirements and work harder to
get their development jobs done under the schedule pressure. Balancing loops B2 and B3 close
the Delivery Rate Gap and release the Pressure to Deliver on Schedule.
Reinforcing Loop R1
Now we turn to the potential benefits of SOA implementation. Service-oriented systems,
developed using SOA design principles (e.g., modularity, loose coupling and standards), are
more reusable, interoperable and easier to integrate with other IT systems (Choi et al. 2010;
Mueller et al. 2010). Therefore, it is easy for developers to make use of the existing reusable
service-oriented systems (e.g., components or services) when they develop new IT systems and
integrate them with existing service-oriented systems that are already installed in the
organization. In this sense, SOA implementation actually makes the development job easier and
allows developers to develop IT systems faster. In other words, SOA implementation increases
22
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Development Productivity of the developers on average (Choi et al. 2010; Hau et al. 2008;
Mueller et al. 2010). In Figure 4, we use a key variable Effectiveness of SOA to represent the
extent to which the developers’ Development Productivity is increased, on average, compared to
their Base Development Productivity in the normal situation prior to SOA implementation.
Specifically, the more service-oriented systems installed in the organization (i.e., the higher
Proportion of Service-Oriented Systems), the more Effectiveness of SOA the developers enjoy
and in turn the higher their average Development Productivity. The rise of Development
Productivity results in the increase of System Delivery Rate.
Figure 4: Reinforcing Loop R1: Implement SOA through Productivity Increase

With higher System Delivery Rate, Delivery Rate Gap is closed and the Pressure to
Deliver on Schedule is released. As a result, developers with less schedule pressure are more
likely to spend more time on developing service-oriented systems, increasing the SystemOriented System Delivery Rate and the number of installed System-Oriented System.
Eventually, the Proportion of System-Oriented System will rise further and SOA becomes more
effective, which further enhance the developers’ Development Productivity. The entire process
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becomes a reinforcing loop R1 which is labeled as “Implement SOA through Productivity
Increase”, as shown in Figure 4. A reinforcing loop can operate as either virtuous (say better and
better) or vicious (say worse and worse) cycles, depending on its current state (Sterman 2000).
When the reinforcing loop R1 operates as virtuous cycles, more service-oriented systems are
implemented (i.e., more penetration of SOA in the organization), SOA becomes more effective
and allows developers to invest more time on further SOA implementation. Conversely, when
R1 operates as vicious cycles, less SOA penetration in the organization generates little
effectiveness of SOA and contributes little to the developers’ development productivity. In this
case under the schedule pressure, developers are likely to shift more time which would have been
spent on SOA implementation to the functional development. Consequently, less serviceoriented systems are developed and the SOA penetration becomes even less.
In order to successfully implement SOA, the reinforcing loop R1 operating as a virtuous
cycle is preferable. However, this cannot always be the case. Many organizations struggling with
their SOA implementation did actually suffer from the vicious cycles of the dynamics (Hau et al.
2008).
It is worth noting that there is a substantial delay between Proportion of Service-Oriented
Systems and Effectiveness of SOA, because it takes time for developers to attend training
sessions and learn experience so as to acquire sufficient knowledge about how to make use of
existing reusable components/services and implement new service-oriented systems. Choi et al.
(2010) explicitly documented that “the learning curve and the introduction of the governance
mechanism will introduce a delay in implementation, as opposed to using current technology”.
We will discuss the impact of the delays in the next section.
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Reinforcing Loop R2
As discussed, Effectiveness of SOA increases the developers’ Development Productivity,
compared to their Base Development Productivity. The degree to which extent the development
productivity is increased can be represented as Increase Ratio of Productivity, as shown in Figure
5. The bigger the ratio, the more benefits and value are perceived by the organizational actors
(e.g., managers and developers). The positive relationship between the effectiveness of
innovative IT (particularly the effectiveness of SOA) and the perceived benefits has been largely
discussed (Mueller et al. 2010). In particular, Choi et al. (2010) pointed out that SOA
implementation effectiveness is an important determinant of the perceived benefits and value
derived from SOA.
Figure 5: Reinforcing Loop R2: Motivate Commitment through Perceived Benefits of SOA

Greater perceived benefits of SOA create favorable word of mouth in the organization
(Sterman 2000) and generate the additional commitment to SOA implementation internally. The
causal link between results of the technology in use and the commitment generation has been
supported by many motivation and organizational theories (Repenning 2002; Vroom 1964). In
this research, the commitment generated by perceived benefits of SOA are considered to be
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internal or endogenous, emphasizing the additional commitment actually results from the results
attribute to use of service-oriented systems. This is supported by social cognition theory saying
“Performance successes strengthen self-beliefs of capability” (Wood et al. 1989).
Besides the endogenous sources of commitment, there are exogenous sources of
commitment which are labeled as Normative Commitment. Institutional theory suggests that
coercive, mimetic and normative pressures are important factors affecting the innovation
adoption (DiMaggio et al. 1983). The work (Liang et al. 2007) on the assimilation of enterprise
systems also provides support that institutional pressures positively affect top management
participation in the ERP assimilation process. In other words, management commitment and
participation mediate the effects of institutional pressures on IT assimilation (Liang et al. 2007).
Figure 5 shows the mediating role played by Management Commitment between
Normative Commitment and SOA implementation. Management Commitment generates
Pressure to Implement SOA and forces developers to spend part of their work hours on
implementing SOA, even though they are still under the Pressure to Deliver on Schedule. When
service-oriented systems are implemented and installed over time, SOA implementation becomes
more effective and enhances developers’ Development Productivity. With more benefits of SOA
perceived by the organization, the effects of favorable word of mouth would generate internal
commitment endogenously and in turn enhance the total Management Commitment. The
reinforcing loop R2, labeled as “Motivate Commitment through Perceived Benefits of SOA”,
represents the dynamics of the commitment motivation. Similar to R1, the reinforcing loop R2
operating as virtuous cycles is clearly preferable and highlights the importance of management
commitment, which is consistent with the existing empirical evidence (Boh et al. 2010; Lee et al.
2010).
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The Causal-Loop Model
The causal-loop model in Figure 6 includes three balancing loops and two reinforcing loops.
The balancing loop B1 indicates developers invest part of their work hours to implement
service-oriented systems. There are two kinds of pressures that affect the tradeoff decision of IT
developers and managers: one is the pressure to deliver the functionalities of IT systems on
schedule, and the other is the pressure to SOA implementation. The balancing loop B1 operates
to close the IS agility gap over time, yet management commitment to SOA plays the important
role in generating the momentum for SOA implementation.
Figure 6: The Causal-Loop Model of SOA Implementation

The balancing loop B2 represents the decision that developers would naturally make to
work harder and to get the functional development completed on schedule. The decision actually
shifts part of their work hours to the functional development and bypasses SOA implementation,
as revealed by the balancing loop B3. Both B2 and B3 indicate the tendency of developers that
puts high priority on delivering functionalities to end users on schedule, which is confirmed by
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many managers that we interviewed. B2 and B3 operate to close the delivery rate gap and release
the schedule pressure. It is worth noting that there is relatively shorter delay within B2 and B3
than the delay within B1. In case of a large delivery rate gap (e.g., urgent IT functionalities are
requested by end users from business units), it is very likely for the IT managers and developers
to make the decision that bypasses the SOA requirements and accelerates the development of
functionalities. This is because System Delivery Rate is a more salient performance indicator
associated to closing the Delivery Rate Gap more quickly, while IS Agility is an organizational,
less salient performance indicator. That human beings tend to overemphasize salient factors
when processing attributions is a well-known cognitive and perceptual bias (Tversky et al. 1974).
Since bypassing SOA requirements only undermines the IS agility in the long term, it is less
likely for people to attribute the unsatisfactory IS agility to such shortcuts due to the substantial
delay. In contrast, closing the Delivery Rate Gap more quickly may probably bring IT managers
and developers favorable gains or avoid negative words from other organizational actors (e.g.,
end users from business units).
The reinforcing loop R1 represents developers’ development productivity increase over
time with more and more service-oriented systems installed in the organization, releasing the
Pressure to Deliver on Schedule. Under less intense schedule pressure, it is more likely for IT
managers and developers to invest their work hours in SOA implementation. However,
developers cannot immediately acquire the knowledge of SOA considering the technical
complexity (Choi et al. 2010) and thus cannot increase their development productivity in a short
period. The substantial delay in the reinforcing loop R1 has two important effects on the
decisions of IT managers and developers. On the one hand, the substantial delay suggests
managers have to keep investing in SOA for a long time and sacrifice the system delivery rate
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before the development productivity takes off. This means the “worse” period of the “worsebefore-better” pattern (Repenning et al. 2001) may last long, but apparently, not every
organization or manager would tolerate a substantially long “worse” period. On the other hand,
the substantial delay makes the causal link between the effectiveness of SOA and system
delivery rate uncertain and less salient. It is thus difficult for people to attribute the rise of system
delivery rate to the investment in SOA implementation several months or even years ago,
because people tend to attribute to more available and salient causes due to cognitive biases
(Tversky et al. 1974).
The reinforcing loop R2 represents the situation where an organization perceives more
benefits from SOA implementation when the development productivity is being improved over
time. Management commitment to SOA may initially come from normative commitment from
top managers. Meanwhile, the perceived benefits of SOA would motivate management
commitment from the internal environment of the organization (perhaps from various
organizational actors including managers and developers) and promote the SOA implementation
further, resulting in more perceived benefits. Similar to R1, R2 is also subject to the substantial
delay between higher SOA penetration and the rise of development productivity. Yet the
substantial delay in R2 has a very important effect but different from the two effects of the delay
in R1. That is, the substantial delay in R2 largely postpones the potential benefits of SOA to be
perceived by organizational actors. Accordingly, organizations that decide to implement SOA
have to be patient enough and tolerate a perhaps long period during which perhaps little benefits
of SOA are perceived, especially at the early stage of SOA implementation. Thus, the primary
part of management commitment to SOA has to come from normative commitment. In such
situations, top management (e.g., CIOs) has to use their leadership to resist possibly unfavorable
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initial word of mouth about SOA. The normative commitment has to be maintained for long
enough before perceived benefits of SOA arrive and enough endogenous commitment is
motivated. The implication is that top management’s leadership in maintaining normative
commitment is important to leverage the benefits of IT in general (Armstrong et al. 1999) and
SOA in particular.
THEORY
Learning Curve of SOA Implementation
SOA, as a new architectural style (Borges et al. 2004), has certain technical complexity and its
implementation process is characterized by a high learning barrier (Choi et al. 2010). In order to
implement service-oriented systems and make use of them in the future IS development,
developers have to invest substantial time and energy in learning the new architectural style, e.g.,
learning SOA design principles and methodologies (Mueller et al. 2010) 6. This suggests there is
substantial delay from the investment in SOA to the rise of development productivity and the
perceived benefits of SOA; the delays are labeled in Figure 6. In other words, it is likely to see
little rise of development productivity and little perceived benefits at the early stage of SOA
implementation process.
Prior research has demonstrated the presence of an organizational learning curve in the
implementation of software packages (Saraswat et al. 1990), the adoption of CASE tools
(Kemerer 1992), and software development methodology (Boh et al. 2007). Traditional wisdom
originally from industrial learning curve suggests that “the rate at which the average cost of
production decreases as the cumulative amount produced increases” (Kemerer 1992) and that the
6

Learning SOA for an organization is far more than just SOA design principles and methodologies. Based on the
evidences f rom our i nterview d ata, we found there are at least three levels o f SOA learning: (1) basic concepts,
design p rinciples; ( 2) specific to ols a nd t echnologies (e .g., J 2EE); a nd (3 ) specific p ractices, s tandards and
methodologies used in the organizations.
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learning curve is shaped as exponential decreasing (Argote et al. 1990; Kemerer 1992). Steeper
learning curve implies higher learning rate and more rapid cost decreases, which is a favorable
case.
However, considering the substantial delays in the reinforcing loops R1 and R2 (as
labeled in Figure 6), we postulate the learning rate of SOA implementation may not be
decreasing constantly during the implementation process. Specifically, we hypothesize the
learning curve of SOA implementation is likely to be flat or decrease very slowly at the early
stage of the implementation process. Only after a certain point, the learning curve would become
steep. In other words, it is likely that the learning curve of SOA implementation turns out to be
reversely S-shaped, instead of an exponential-decreasing shape suggested by the traditional
wisdom (Argote et al. 1990; Kemerer 1992). The hypothesis on the learning curve of SOA
implementation has been observed empirically. As Hau et al. (2008) note, “the first release of an
SOA application to take additional time because adherence to SOA design principles often leads
to longer design time without yielding immediate benefits” (Choi et al. 2010; Hau et al. 2008).
In fact, the hypothesis on the learning curve of SOA implementation can be generalized
to a larger context of innovative technology implementation. According to a survey of 60 sites,
Chew et al. (1991) conclude that performance on initial projects with new technology
implementation is usually worse than performance on projects with the old technology and this
effect eventually wears off with improved positive performance (Chew et al. 1991). After
investigating CASE tool adoption from a perspective of learning curve, Kemerer also observed
that initial projects adopting CASE tools are relatively more expensive than later projects
(Kemerer 1992), which is similar to the observation of SOA implementation done by Hau et al.
(2008). This research suggests that the time delays in the reinforcing loops R1 and R2 is a
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plausible explanation for the reversely S-shaped learning curve of innovative technology
implementation in general and SOA implementation in particular.
Organizational Traps
As indicated above, due to the substantial delay, managers and developers are likely to bypass
SOA requirements and/or underinvest in SOA, especially when urgent IT functionalities are
requested by end users from business units and intense schedule pressure is created. Bypassing
SOA requirements may even be institutionalized in some organizations. A project manager that
we interviewed told that:
There are actually “waiver processes”. When the requests [of IT functionalities] from
end users are urgent enough or some emergence happens, they can apply for the waiver
and don’t need to go through the whole process [e.g., bypassing SOA requirements].
This is a tactic vs. strategic balance in our organization. And different departments
actually have different waiver processes…
Underinvestment in SOA postpones the first release of an SOA application and perhaps
allows delivering non-service-oriented systems, leading to less penetration of SOA in the
organization and in turn less effectiveness of SOA implementation. As a result, the perceived
benefits of SOA are further delayed and negative word of mouth may spread across the
organization. For example, the technical complexity of SOA is overemphasized, instability of
open standards for SOA and inappropriateness of SOA are misperceived (Choi et al. 2010; Hau
et al. 2008). In such situations, the organization is likely to be stuck in two different traps:
technology learning trap and implementation effectiveness trap.
Technology learning trap refers to the situation in which a certain technology is less
understood due to insufficient learning, the more difficult and complex the technology is
perceived. Technology learning trap indicates a vicious cycle of the “learning-by-doing” (Arrow
1962) or more specifically “learning-by-using” process (Rosenberg 1982). Consequently,
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developers may continue to underinvest in SOA and thus the initial flat part of the learning curve
of SOA implementation is actually prolonged, which postpones the perceived benefits of SOA
even further. Thus, the organization is trapped in the initial flat yet prolonging part of the
learning curve of SOA implementation and can hardly see it taking off ever.
Implementation effectiveness trap refers to the situation in which SOA is misperceived to
be inappropriate when SOA implementation is temporally less effective and the perceived
benefits of SOA are delayed. It is likely for the organization to falsely conclude that SOA is
inappropriate to its organizational context, rather than to admit that it is just due to insufficient
SOA penetration in the organization. As a result, developers continue to underinvest in SOA and
deliver non-service-oriented systems, further undermining the effectiveness of SOA
implementation. In such a case, the organization is stuck in the trap and can hardly realize the
effectiveness of SOA.
Technology learning trap and implementation effectiveness trap are different but intertwined
with each other. Because top management team may change (Lee et al. 2004) or their strategic
attention (and resources) often fades away over time (Kotter 1995), the two traps result in the
failures of SOA implementation efforts of many organizations when the normative commitment
to SOA fades away.
Note that the theory of the two organizational traps suggested in this research rejects the
traditional perspective of a static, deterministic learning curve of innovation technology
implementation (Boh et al. 2007; Chew et al. 1991; Kemerer 1992; Saraswat et al. 1990). The
learning rate (i.e., the slope of the learning curve) is nondeterministic and actually affected by
various organizational contexts and properties, such as the interpretation and actions of
organizational actors as well as structures (Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski 1993). The view of a
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dynamic learning curve may explain the inconsistent statistics of measuring the learning curve
for CASE tools disclosed by Kemerer (1992), as prior research with technological determinism
tends to ignore organizational contexts and properties which may affect organizational change
and learning. Further, the theory of organizational traps suggests the social world (in this case the
organizational outcomes of SOA implementation) is “produced and reinforced by humans
through their action and interaction” (Orlikowski et al. 1991).
Causes of the Traps
We extend the theory of organizational traps in SOA implementation by discussing the plausible
causes contributing to the traps.
First, the fundamental tension that results in the traps during SOA implementation is the
tradeoff between short-term performance drop and the potential long-term benefits, indicated by
the “worse-before-better” pattern (Repenning et al. 2001). As Hau et al. (2008) note, one of the
primary challenges of SOA implementation is that “many firms failed to realize the benefits of
SOA because they suffered from the inherent tradeoff between long-term benefits versus shortterm local needs of project management” (Hau et al. 2008). Investing resources (e.g., time and
financial budgets) in SOA implementation and corresponding organizational change clearly
disrupts the normal operation of the organization to a large extent. In particular, developers need
to devote substantial amount of their work hours to SOA implementation, which decreases their
responsiveness to the request for IT functionalities from business units at the early stage of the
implementation process. As the model suggests (see Figure 6), there are two different
performance gaps that managers and developers need to close up: delivery rate gap and IS agility
gap. In order to improve IS agility, the organization probably has to sacrifice the short-term
performance. However, system delivery rate is a more salient, immediate and certain
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performance indicator and the urgency of IT functionality request from business units often
emphasizes the salience, whereas IS agility is an organizational-level, less salient, less immediate
and uncertain performance indicator. Because of the cognitive and perceptual bias that human
tend to overemphasize salient and certain factors when processing attributions (Tversky et al.
1974), organizational actors are likely to overweight delivery rate gap and ignore improving IS
agility. Repenning and Sterman (2002) support the tradeoff tension and point that “subjects [in
many experiments] have been shown to grossly overweight the short-run positive benefits of
their decisions while ignoring the long-run, negative consequences” (Repenning et al. 2002). In
some circumstances, sacrificing the long-term benefits of SOA seems inevitable for some
organizations. The CIO of a large energy company explained this dilemma:
Firms will likely scale back on SOA investment due to economic conditions, sacrificing
long term benefit for short term gains. As the short term view is focused on survival,
this is the right change of focus. This will result in higher overall SOA costs as
investments to date will either become stranded, or written off. At some future point,
when such projects resume, technology and staff will have changed, not permitting
continuity from where things were left. Time to realize benefits will be extended due to
both total cost and total time to implement.
Second, there may be interest conflicts of different groups of organizational actors (e.g., top
management, business line units, and IT unit). Local business units often focus much on how fast
their requests of new IT functionalities can be delivered on schedule, so that they can catch the
business opportunities that come out but may disappear in a short period. Based on our
interviews, local business units usually do not understand or appreciate much about the
organizational IS agility. In many cases, local business units have much power to urge their
requests, because they control the resources of generating revenues for the organization. Thus,
organizations probably have to give up part of the needs of local business units to some extent at
least at the early stage of the implementation process. Hau et al. (2008) discuss the tension
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between “long term global benefits of SOA [e.g., IS agility] and short term local needs of project
management [requested by business units]” (Hau et al. 2008) is a key challenge in SOA
implementation. Choi et al. (2010) explicitly point out that “most firms cannot afford giving up
short-term benefits when project management goals [set by business units] and the necessity to
adhere to SOA design principles conflict with each other” (Choi et al. 2010).
Third, SOA, as a complex architectural style, manifests the agency of organizational actors
(e.g., IT managers and developers) to control their interaction with the technology of SOA and
its characteristics. Thus, organizational actors have much flexibility in design, implement, use,
and interpretation of service-oriented systems, indicating the notion of interpretive flexibility of
technological artifacts (Orlikowski 1992). An IT project manager from a large organization
clearly noted:
Our developers usually have alternative ways to deliver the same capability
[functionalities of the IT systems] to end users. Since we have different choices, we
chose the way that we think is appropriate to develop the systems… We are able to
bypass the service-oriented requirements when we do not have enough time and
resource to do it or SOA is not a good idea…
Interpretive flexibility allows the technology of SOA to be appropriated in diverse ways by
actors in different organizations or by the same actors in different organizational contexts. Thus,
there is possibility that organizational actors may inappropriately implement or use SOA and
misinterpret the effectiveness of SOA implementation. An IT manger from a large software
vendor commented on the challenge of interpretive flexibility of SOA implementation:
It is difficult to monitor along the way whether the developers actually use the SOA
standards and methodology to build the systems. So I think QA [quality assurance] is
important. But even there is a QA process, it usually comes in at the end of the project.
Enforcement of compliance to SOA standards and methodology is challenging.
While organizations enjoying the perceived benefits of SOA early are more dedicated to their
SOA implementation efforts, those falling short of their expectation of SOA are likely to
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underinvest in their SOA implementation, resulting in an even worse situation. It is less likely for
them to attribute the worse results of SOA implementation to their past actions (e.g.,
underinvestment in SOA). The complex dynamics of SOA implementation process bias
organizational actors’ interpretation and appropriateness of SOA, triggering the vicious cycle of
declining SOA implementation.
Finally, when the perceived benefits of SOA do not meet the immediate expectations,
managers and developers tend to blame the technical complexity and inappropriateness of SOA
instead of attributing that they have bypassed the SOA requirements in their past actions.
Organizational actors in the case of SOA implementation are more likely to attribute the
ineffectiveness to the technology itself. The tendency of humans to blame the technology rather
than themselves is widely observed and documented in the literature (Avital et al. 2001). As
Shneiderman (1990) notes, “Complex and confusing systems enable users and designers to
blame the machine” (Shneiderman 1990). Also, Brown et al. (1998) wrote that “An
understandable reaction [for frustrated users] is to blame the technology, but the attempts to
achieve the advantages of information systems can be thwarted by both technological and
organizational constraints” (Brown et al. 1998). After observing the adoption process of the
faculty educational technology in a university, Moser (2007) found that “If technology was
involved, however, faculty were quick to blame the failure on the technology and abandon newly
acquired teaching practice and technology use” (Moser 2007). When stuck in the technology
learning trap and implication effectiveness trap, blaming the complexity and inappropriateness of
the technology, providing a possibility for organizational actors to excuse their past actions of
underinvestment in SOA implementation, is actually misperceived and false. The vicious cycle
of declining SOA implementation reinforces the excuse and misperception. Such
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misinterpretation about the ineffectiveness or inappropriateness of SOA implementation reveals
organizational actors’ self-confirming attribution error (Repenning et al. 2002). Accordingly,
Lorenzi et al. (2003) clearly suggest “Existing organizational and/or people problems often
surface during the implementation of new technical systems. Instead of waiting for latent
problems to emerge, organizations should deal with managerial problems before implementing
new technology. If it is not possible to effectively handle the problems, the organization must at
least avoid placing blame for the problem on the technological system” (Lorenzi et al. 2003).
IMPLICATION
This paper has presented the findings of a study on SOA implementation and, particularly, the
theory of organizational traps associated with the implementation of innovative IS technologies.
The findings and theory articulated here have important implications for research and practice.
Research Implication
This research assumes to a large extent that SOA, once implemented well in an organization, can
enhance the organization’s IS agility and developers’ development productivity in the long term
(Choi et al. 2010; Hau et al. 2008; Mueller et al. 2010; Yoon et al. 2007). Yet the intended
benefits of SOA cannot be realized automatically and many organizations have encountered
organizational and human challenges in their SOA implementation efforts (Fricko 2006; Luthria
et al. 2008). Therefore, this research adopts the process perspective which is largely overlooked
by prior studies that use variance models (Mohr 1982) and seek to explain the variance in
outcomes from SOA. Using the process perspective is a clear distinction between this paper and
the existing literature on SOA (Boh et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2010; Mueller et al. 2010; Yoon et al.
2007). By doing so, this research suggests a theoretical explanation for the contradictory results
of SOA implementation paradox from an organizational perspective. That is, it is likely to be
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explained by the differences in processes, interpretations and actions around the implementation
and use of service-oriented systems in different organizations. Due to the dynamics and
nonlinearity of the process, the connections between starting conditions, actions, and outcomes
in SOA implementation are not deterministic.
In fact, the extant IS literature indicates that human agency often plays an important, and
sometimes critical, role in organization-wide IS implementation, like Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) implementation (Orlikowski 1992; Volkoff et al. 2007). In the IS literature on
ERP, Grant et al. (2006) write “key stakeholders in the ERP implementation process adopted
different discourses” and highlighted the role of their discourses in the social shaping of ERP
implementation (Grant et al. 2006). Scott el al. (2003) further point out that the “success” or
“failure” of the ERP implementation is actually highly situated and relate to “the negotiations
between actor networks surrounding the implementation process” (Scott et al. 2003). Although
ERP as a monolithic IS architecture is very different from SOA and thus has different
organizational implications, prior research on ERP leads us to accommodate human agency in
this research and to examine the important role that human agency plays during the SOA
implementation process.
The implementation of SOA manifests the agency and voluntarism of organizational
actors (e.g., IT managers and developers). There is a high degree to which those organizational
actors are engaged in SOA implementation process during both the implementation and use of
service-oriented systems. As indicated in the model (see Figure 6), the actions that implement
SOA and that use SOA are mutually influenced by each other, both of which in most
circumstances are acted by the same organizational actors (e.g., IT managers and developers) in
similar organizational context (time and space), because developers of service-oriented systems
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are also users of those systems. This characteristic of time-space continuity between the
implementation and use of SOA illuminates the notion of “duality of technology” named by
Orlikowski (1992), that is, “the technology is created and changed by human action, yet it is also
used by humans to accomplish some action” (Orlikowski 1992). Thanks to the clear
characteristic of time-space continuity, the implementation process of SOA is a meaningful field
to study the duality of technology which can provide insights different from that derived from
the conceptual dualism of technology dominating the IS literature (Orlikowski 1992).
SOA implementation requires organizations to invest substantial resources upfront before
potential benefits are perceived by organizational actors, known as the “worse-before-better”
phenomenon (Repenning et al. 2001). That is, there are substantial delays between the
implementation investment and the perceived benefits. During the “worse” period of the
implementation, different organizational actors often make different senses and judgments about
what becomes “worse” to them, how “worse” it will be, and how long the “worse” will last.
Impatient organizational actors are likely to underinvest in SOA implementation and thus the
dynamics can get stuck in the two intertwined traps: technology learning trap and
implementation effectiveness trap. Once stuck in the traps, it would be difficult for
organizational actors to correctly attribute to the vicious cycle of the dynamics of the
implementation process. Due to the misattribution, the subsequent reaction of the organizational
actors may further exacerbate the situation of the vicious cycle. This research suggests that the
technology learning trap and implementation effectiveness trap result from not only the
characteristics of technology (in this case, SOA) and the inherent structure of the implementation
process (i.e., the balancing and reinforcing feedback loops), but the dynamic interactions
between human agency and the technology implementation process, indicating the duality of
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technology (Orlikowski 1992). The misattribution of organizational actors when they are stuck in
the traps reflects another form of self-confirming error; yet it is different from that discussed in
Repenning’s works on process improvement in manufacturing (Repenning et al. 2002).
More empirical research on the theory of organizational traps and the theoretical
explanation for SOA implementation paradox is needed. In particular, empirical validation and
elaboration of the findings in this research will enrich the theory developed here and provide
more refined understanding of the dynamics of the SOA implementation process in various
organizational settings.
Practice implication
Managers who make the decision of SOA implementation for their organizations need to be
aware and prepared of the potential traps in the implementation process. Long-term commitment
is definitely helpful to SOA implementation. Patient and consistent decision-makings about the
tradeoff between short-term performance drop and potential long-term benefits and about the
tradeoff between local project needs and organization-level SOA implementation are important.
In addition, institutionalization of the long-term commitment and consistent decision-making
about the tradeoffs using appropriate governance mechanisms may increase the chance of
successful SOA implementation (Joachim et al. 2011; Varadan et al. 2008).
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